Focused deterrence
A strategy that combines communicating the consequences of violence with support for developing positive routes away from it.
A strategy that combines communicating the consequences of violence with support for developing positive routes away from it.
Focused deterrence is an approach to violence reduction that was developed in Boston (USA) in the mid-1990s. It recognises that most serious violence is associated with a small group of people who are themselves very likely to be victims of violence, trauma, and extremely challenging circumstances. Their involvement in violence is often driven by exploitation, victimisation and self-protection. Some versions of focused deterrence, including the original “Boston Ceasefire” intervention of the 1990s, focus primarily on groups rather than individuals. These approaches recognise that violence is often driven by conflict between groups. If two groups are engaged in violent conflict, focusing on the individuals who have committed violent crimes is unlikely to prevent future conflict between other members in the groups.
Focused deterrence attempts to identify the people most likely to be involved in violence and support them to desist. The age of the people involved depends on the context and the crime problem identified but projects have worked with children as young as 14 or 15. For example, the average age of participants in a focused deterrence project in Glasgow was 16.
It combines several core strategies.
Focused deterrence usually includes a combination of the following steps.
Different focused deterrence models vary in how much they emphasize different stages of this process. Models which emphasize enforcement might focus on using ‘call-in’ meetings to communicate the consequences of violence and taking swift action if the people involved do not desist. Other models might not use ‘call-in’ meetings at all, have minimal emphasis on enforcement, and instead emphasize developing relationships, rehabilitation and early intervention.
There are several potential explanations why focused deterrence could prevent serious crime and violence. The involvement of the community and social services could provide positive routes away from crime and violence. The potential for targeted, swift and certain sanctions might act as a deterrent. The people who are the focus of the approach might not understand the legal consequences of their actions – simply informing them of those realities might have an impact. Finally, collaboration between the community and police could develop relationships and legitimacy, improving the efficacy of future crime prevention activity.
The research suggests that the average impact of focused deterrence on violent crime is likely to be high.
Our estimate is based on a review of 24 studies which suggests that, on average, focused deterrence strategies reduced crime by 33%. Many of the studies included in this review had a specific focus on violent crime as an outcome. The strongest crime reduction impacts were found in 12 studies on programmes designed to reduce serious violence generated by conflict between groups. Interventions targeting individuals and drug markets had smaller but still positive impacts.
We have high confidence in our estimate of the impact on violent crime.
The estimate is based on one high-quality review of many studies. We did not give this topic the highest security rating because there is a lot of variation in the studies in the review. Some studies suggested that the impact was higher and others suggested it was lower. 22 of 24 studies in the review found positive impacts. The two remaining studies found very small negative effects.
Most of the available research was conducted in the USA. Only one study in the review, an evaluation of the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) in Glasgow, is from the UK. This project was modelled on the Boston Ceasefire project and the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence and aimed to address high levels of violence in a deprived area of Glasgow. It offered access to diversionary activities, personal development, and employment preparedness in exchange for a “no violence, no weapon” pledge. The evaluation suggested that offensive weapons possession crimes reduced by half for young people who participated in the intervention for two years, but there was no change in serious violence.
The YEF identified two further evaluations of focused deterrence in England and Wales:
Teams which have used the approach in the UK have found they need to adapt it to fit their local context. For example, the CIRV project in Glasgow noted that the groups involved in violent conflict in Glasgow are quite different to those in Cincinnati. In Glasgow these groups tend to have no organised hierarchy, use knifes rather than guns, and tend to be much younger. While the Cincinnati project worked with the adult prison population, the Glasgow team developed activities for the under-16 age group, including children who were at the early stages of involvement but had not yet committed any offences.
Focused deterrence requires close collaboration between community members and service providers committed to violence prevention. Successful focused deterrence model tend to identify key stakeholders and design and implement the work with them. The developers of focused deterrence argue that much of the most effective work will be happening outside mainstream actors and institutions and projects should work with and learn from these actors.
Poor communication between the police and community around official strategies and actions can increase community distrust. It is important the police maintain a dialogue with the community throughout the intervention. The police should communicate the legitimate reasons for working with a particular community and the positive outcomes they are aiming to achieve.
Focused deterrence is a complex approach which requires coordination between many stakeholders. It is likely to require careful planning to ensure stakeholders are prepared to collaborate and share information.
Providing clarity on the aims of the programme, how to implement it and what the right balance between deterrence and protection is, can help ensure the programme is implemented as intended. For example, the Glasgow team received initial training from the original developers of CIRV in the USA.
The call-in meeting should be on neutral territory, otherwise it is less likely to serve its intended purpose. Planning what messages police communicate could help strike the right balance between deterrence and protection and make it less likely the police alienate community representatives.
It must be made clear that focused deterrence attends to groups because of their involvement in violence and this violence must be addressed to protect them and others. It should be clear that the selection of groups is driven by violence prevention rather ethnicity or identity.
On average, the cost of focused deterrence is likely to be high.
There is information available about the cost of two focused deterrence projects in the UK.
Costs include paying service providers, additional time and resources spent targeting crime groups and coordinating between different services, any additional staff to deliver the intervention, and finding a neutral location for call in-meetings.
Take away messages
Evaluation of Glasgow CIRV
An evaluation of the CIRV project in Glasgow
Group Violence Intervention London: An Evaluation of the Shield Pilot CIRV
An evaluation of the Shield Pilot in London
Summary of an evaluation of Community Intervention to Reduce Violence in Northamptonshire.