Focussed Deterrence

Toolkit technical report

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June 2021

This report is produced in collaboration with staff from the Campbell Collaboration Secretariat. It is a derivative product, which summarises information from Campbell systematic reviews, and other reviews, to support evidence-informed decision making'.

Abstract/Plain Language summary

The objective of this technical report is to review the evidence on the effect of focussed deterrence on the involvement on children and young people in crime and violence. Focussed deterrence is a crime prevention strategy which combines deterrence through increasing the swiftness and certainty of punishment along with mobilizing community voices against crime and providing social services to increase protective factors. Focussed deterrence aims to reduce specific types of crime by people who are frequently involved in them, for example, those involved in gang-related offending or drug dealing.

Focussed deterrence strategies are also known as "pulling levers" policing programs which involve the analysis of recurring crime and the customisation of local responses to these offences. The 'levers' refer to all available tools and strategies that local agencies have to prevent offending and respond to offending behaviour.

This technical report is based on one systematic review, published by Braga et al. (2019). Given the lack of systematic reviews on this intervention, we also use an evaluation of the 'Community Initiative to Reduce Violence' in Glasgow (Williams et al., 2014) and an evaluation of 'Operation Shield' in London (Davies et al., 2016) to inform the current technical report.

The core features of these interventions include: (1) focus on a specific crime problem, such as youth knife crime, gang violence, or drug dealing; (2) an interagency enforcement group of police, probation, parole and other legal agencies, (3) research and experience of police officers is used to identify key people involved in the specific crime problem; (4) a 'special enforcement operation' is framed to address the specific crime problem being committed by specific people in specific contexts; (5) other services and community support are implemented in the affected communities; (6) direct and frequent communication with the people who are the focus of the intervention is established to relay that they are being specifically targeted and which of their behaviours will warrant special attention from law enforcement, which will usually involve a call-in meeting for offenders, their parents, police

and other law enforcement agencies, service providers and community representatives (Kennedy, 2006).

The components that are involved in focussed deterrence interventions can include situational crime prevention and increased police presence, as well as extending guardianship; assisting natural surveillance; strengthening formal surveillance; reducing the anonymity of offenders; and the use of informal social control mechanisms. Focussed deterrence strategies also include components to redirect people away from offending and towards social services and rehabilitative activities, such as job training, employment opportunities, substance abuse treatment, and housing assistance (Braga et al., 2019).

The theory of change for focussed deterrence is mainly based on deterrence theory but emphasises ensuring that swift and certain sanctions are enforced for offending behaviour. Legitimacy theory and trust in the police are also important.

Braga et al. (2019) reviewed 24 evaluations of focussed deterrence strategies that used quasi-experimental designs. Half of the programmes targeted criminally active gangs (n = 12), nine targeted open-air drug markets, and three programmes targeted 'high-risk' offenders. Only one of the evaluations was conducted outside the United States. This evaluation was conducted in Scotland (Williams et al., 2014). Studies were published between 2001 and 2015.

The overall effect of focussed deterrence on officially recorded crimes is d = 0.38, which is equivalent to a large 33% decrease compared to the offending rate in comparison groups. The evidence rating is 4.

Interventions that targeted violence between conflicting groups were associated with the largest effect size (d = 0.66, p < .05). Focussed deterrence strategies that targeted 'high-risk' individuals were also effective (d = 0.20, p < .05) but interventions that were categorised as 'drug market interventions' were associated with a smaller mean effect size (d = 0.09, p < .05). Braga et al. (2019) note that the smaller mean effect size associated with drug market

interventions could be a consequence of the significant threats to treatment integrity or implementation issues.

Focussed deterrence requires community buy-in, which should be ensured before starting the programme. Other implementation issues are lack of support from police including management who may not support aspects of the approach, notably not taking known offenders into custody; the need for service and inter-force communication; a proper venue for the call-in meeting and ensuring a proper balance between deterrence and providing protective services.

There is a need for evaluations of focussed deterrence approaches to tackling youth crime in England and Wales – and to ensure that existing approaches are learned from. Focussed deterrence strategies are often implemented in communities that are already heavily targeted by police operations, which therefore may not have trust in police powers. Focussed deterrence strategies need to be implemented and communicated in a way that the reasons for targeting particular groups are justified by offending behaviour, and not based on ethnicity or identity. Interventions need to work within the context of existing protective (safeguarding) and other supportive approaches, and need to evaluate the effect not just on those targeted by the interventions but also on others who are affected, e.g., through county lines.

Objective and approach

The objective of this technical report is to review the evidence on the effect of focussed deterrence programmes on the involvement of children and young people in crime and violence. Focussed deterrence is a crime prevention strategy which combines deterrence through increasing the certainty and severity of punishment along with mobilizing community voices against crime and providing social services and help to support desistance. Focussed deterrence strategies aim to reduce specific types of crime, for example, violent conflict between rival groups or drug dealing.

This technical report is based on one systematic review, published by Braga et al., (2019). More details are given in the book by Braga and Kennedy (2020). As there are a limited number of eligible meta-analyses of focussed deterrence strategies, an evaluation of the 'Community Initiative to Reduce Violence' in Glasgow (Williams et al., 2014) also informs the current technical report. This was the only non-American evaluation in the review by Braga et al. (2019).

The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were used to inform the selection of systematic reviews.

Inclusion criteria

To be included in this report, a systematic review must include evaluations of the effects of focussed deterrence strategies on crime and violence.

Exclusion criteria

Two somewhat relevant reviews are excluded from the current technical report. The review by Abt and Winship (2016) has a broader scope and does not specifically include only focussed deterrence strategies, but instead is concerned with interventions for community violence. The review by Wong et al. (2012) has a limited scope and includes only outcomes of gang membership.

Outcomes

Braga et al. (2019) studied the effectiveness of focussed deterrence strategies on officially recorded levels of crime in certain places or on crimes committed by individuals. The most commonly targeted crimes were gang-related and drug markets. Crime could be measured using crime incident reports, calls to emergency services, or police data on arrests. Braga et al. (2019) also included evaluations that reported effects on crime displacement and diffusion. The effectiveness of focussed deterrence strategies is not reported independently for youth offending outcomes.

Description of interventions

Focussed deterrence strategies are also known as “pulling levers” policing programs and are framed by an “action research model that is common to both problem-oriented policing and public health interventions to reduce violence” (Braga et al., 2019, p. 3). This involves the specific analysis of recurring crime and the customisation of local responses to these offences. The ‘levers’ refer to all available tools and strategies that local agencies have to prevent offending and respond to offending behaviour. Gang-related offending and group-based violence are normally the targets of focussed deterrence and components of interventions concentrate on sanctions for all group members, not just those who commit offences.

Kennedy (2006) outlined a basic framework for ‘pulling levers’ interventions. The core features of these interventions are as follows:

- A specific crime problem, such as youth knife crime, violence between conflicting groups, or drug dealing, is chosen as the target problem for the intervention.
- An interagency enforcement group of police, probation, parole, and other legal agencies is created.
- The research and experience of police officers is used to identify key offenders involved in the specific crime problem.
- A ‘special enforcement operation’ is framed to address the specific crime problem being committed by specific offenders in specific contexts, using all available levers to prevent these behaviours.
- Other services and community support are implemented in the affected communities.
- Direct and frequent communication with the people who are the focus of the intervention is established to relay that they are being specifically targeted and which of their behaviours will warrant special attention from law enforcement. Communication about what they can do to avoid penalties is also important. This contact can be through a ‘call in’ meeting for all involved, possibly including those from rival con-

flicting groups. The call-in meeting includes people who are the focus of the intervention, their parents, police and other law enforcement agencies, service providers and community representatives.

Braga and Kennedy (2020, p. 4) state that not all interventions conducted within a focussed deterrence approach will follow these steps, but they do share similar basic principles to "go beyond either simple or unalloyed deterrence thinking and action". In brief, these principles are as follows:

1. Most serious crime is associated with a small number of people.
2. Most serious violent offenders will commit a wide range of offences and there is a consistent association between neighbourhood violence and experience of victimisation and offending.
3. Co-offending and offending in groups, such as gangs, is an important dimension of repeat offending.
4. Punishment for offending should be "certain and swift" and involve "creative application of existing enforcement" in the existing legal framework. For example, if charges for a serious violent offence cannot be made, then an offender may be pursued for less serious offences, such as drug trafficking, assault, possession of a weapon, theft, or robbery. Moreover, consequences for offending can be outside the criminal justice system, such as being evicted from rental housing, or redirecting traffic away from known drug markets.
5. There should be deliberate and effective communication with individuals about the real risks and punishments associated with their offending.
6. There should be provision of outreach and support to the people who are the focus of the intervention.
7. Perceptions of police legitimacy and procedural justice should be improved amongst the community.
8. The impact of the intervention on the targeted crime problem should be evaluated.

Intervention components

The components involved in focussed deterrence can include situational crime prevention and increased police presence. Braga et al. (2019) outline the following key components of focussed deterrence strategies: extending guardianship; assisting natural surveillance; strengthening formal surveillance; reducing the anonymity of offenders; and the use of informal social control mechanisms.

Focussed deterrence strategies also include components to redirect people away from offending and towards social services and rehabilitative activities, such as job training, employment opportunities, substance abuse treatment, and housing assistance (Braga et al., 2019).

At the community level, focussed deterrence strategies aim to improve collective efficacy, as communities with strong collective efficacy are said to have high capacities for "collective action for the public good" (Braga et al., 2019). Community action in focussed deterrence strategies helps to disable the justifications people may use to defer responsibility for their offending and community support is also important for successful implementation of the intervention.

Targeted or Universal

Focussed deterrence strategies are an example of a targeted intervention. These strategies are increasingly used to reduce serious violent crime committed by conflicting groups (Braga et al., 2019). A core component of focussed deterrence strategies is the targeted nature of these approaches. In place of wider-scale interventions, these strategies target a small and specific group of individuals to outline the clear 'cause-and-effect' relationship between violence and law enforcement responses.

A key component of focussed deterrence is the finding that most crimes occur in a small number of places at certain frequent times and by a small number of individuals (Abt & Winship, 2018). Therefore, focussed deterrence strategies to reduce community violence should adopt interventions using place-based, people-based, and behaviour-based

approaches (Abt & Winship, 2018). In other words, interventions should target the environments and places where crime occurs, target the individuals who are involved in violence, and the behaviours that are likely to trigger violence such as weapon carrying, alcohol or drug abuse, and gang membership.

Implementation setting and personnel

Focussed deterrence strategies are implemented by law enforcement, but also involve communities and an array of social service agencies. These are complicated and complex intervention approaches that require a high-level of management and organisation of multiple stakeholders across numerous agencies. Braga and Kennedy (2020) suggest that a formal structure, such as mayoral support, is needed to ensure that city-wide strategies are implemented correctly.

Duration and scale

No information is provided on the specific duration and scale of intervention components that are involved in focussed deterrence strategies, but Braga et al. (2019) refer to a post-intervention period of between 6 and 65 months.

Example of intervention

The 'Community Initiative to Reduce Violence' was implemented to reduce gang-related violence and weapon carrying amongst male youth in a deprived area of Glasgow (Williams et al., 2014). A 'preliminary post hoc before-and-after quasi-experimental' design was used to evaluate the effects of focussed deterrence on violent and non-violent offending. The sample included 167 males, aged between 16 and 29 years of age. The mean age was 17.8 years old. No information about the ethnicity of participants is provided. A control group of age-matched gang-involved youth was selected from a similar area of Glasgow that did not participate in the intervention and also had high rates of youth violence.

The focussed deterrence strategy was led by Strathclyde Police and involved support services from health, education, social services, housing and community safety (Williams et al., 2014). The intervention was based on a U.S. initiative that used a holistic focussed deterrence

approach to reduce gun violence amongst gang members (Engel et al., 2013). The intervention components included intelligence gathering, multi-agency individualised support and police enforcement.

The intervention was implemented between October 2008 and April 2011 and began with police intelligence gathering to identify gang-related youth in Glasgow. Williams et al. (2014) reported that 55 groups involved in criminal activity were identified and an estimated 700 individuals who were involved in gang-related offending. Ten self-referral sessions were held at the Glasgow Sheriff Court and young men involved in gang-related offending were invited to attend. Referral also occurred through word of mouth and calls to a freephone number (Williams et al., 2014). A meeting was then arranged between the youth and a street worker to explain the intervention and obtain a written commitment (or a pledge) to abstain from violence and not carry a weapon. This “no violence, no weapon” pledge was monitored by the police, and if an individual was found to have breached the pledge, services were temporarily withdrawn (Williams et al., 2014). An ethos of collective responsibility was enforced by ensuring that, if one gang member broke the pledge, then all gang members would be excluded from the intervention.

No incentives to participate were provided and access to services included in the focussed deterrence strategy was allocated based on a ‘needs analysis’. Services included signposting to existing services (e.g., education, healthcare, housing, and social services) and services provided by dedicated providers (e.g., diversionary activities, personal development, and job-readiness training).

The results of the evaluation showed that there were reductions in most types of violent (e.g., assault or weapon possession) and non-violent (e.g., drugs, road traffic offences and anti-social behaviour) offending in both the intervention and comparison groups (Williams et al., 2014). Participants were evaluated in two cohorts based on the length of involvement in the intervention.

In the 1-year cohort there was a 14% reduction in non-violent offending, and in the 2-year cohort there was a 34% reduction in non-violent offending, but there were no statistically significant differences between the intervention and control groups (Williams et al., 2014, p. 688). There was a 27% rate of reduction in violent offending in the 1-year cohort with no statistical difference between the intervention and control groups, but in the 2-year cohort, the reduction of violent offending in the intervention group (52%) was statistically significantly larger than in the control group (29%).

Physical violence also reduced in the 1-year cohort (21%) and the 2-year cohort (31%) but the differences between the intervention and control groups were not statistically significant. There were also reductions in the rate of weapon carrying in both the intervention group (65%) and control group (35%) in the 1-year cohort and between the intervention group (82%) and control group (40%) in the 2-year cohort, but the differences were not statistically significant. All these effects are quite large.

Theory of change/presumed causal mechanisms

Interventions conducted within the focussed deterrence approach may vary but will employ similar prevention mechanisms. Whilst deterrence theory posits that crime can be prevented through the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, focussed deterrence strategies aim to prevent crime through the "advertising of the law enforcement strategy and the personalised nature of its application" (Braga et al., 2019). The emphasis in focussed deterrence is on the certainty and swiftness of sanctions for offending behaviour. Focussed deterrence should not be understood as a simple diversion approach (i.e., providing services in lieu of custodial sentences)[1]. Offenders and prospective offenders need to understand that, if offending continues, similar sanctions will be incurred (Braga & Kennedy, 2020). A 'cause and effect' model needs to be communicated effectively to offenders for focussed deterrence to work.

[1] We are grateful to David Kennedy for his expert insight on this approach and to Professor Anthony Braga for guidance and feedback on the current technical report.

The sanctions used in focussed deterrence interventions may not always be legal sanctions, as often legal sanctions may have no effect or may not deter members of an offending group/gang from continuing to engage in criminal activity. For example, if a member of a gang is living in rented accommodation, a sanction for offending may be to evict the individual under civil law or police may redirect traffic from or limit public access to an area where a gang sells drugs (Braga & Kennedy, 2020). This would have significant financial repercussions for the group. When targeting group-based offending, the direct target of sanctions may not be the individual who commits the offence (e.g. a young person delivering drugs or instructed to assault a member of a rival gang). Gangs are often hierarchical structures and sanctions can be implemented to hold gang leaders to account for gang member offending. Braga and Kennedy (2020, p. 9) write: "In theory and practice, group-focussed deterrence is based on the premise that it is not the severity of individual sanctions that produces violence reductions, but the knowledge on the part of the group members that violence will produce some, often relatively low-level, cost to a critical mass of group members, which then drives changes in group dynamics".

Focussed deterrence strategies go beyond deterrence to building protective factors. They thus seek to change offender behaviour by understanding the underlying individual and environmental factors that sustain recurring crime and implement an "appropriately focussed blended strategy of law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service actions" (Braga et al., 2019, p. 4). Legitimacy and trust in police are also essential components of the theory of change involved in focussed deterrence. These interventions are generally implemented in disadvantaged areas where perceived police legitimacy may already be low and the community may already feel unfairly targeted by police operations. Therefore, for focussed deterrence to work effectively, the aims of the targeted approach need to be communicated to all members of the community. Community buy-in is fundamental to the success of focussed deterrence, and the benefits of these interventions for all members of the community need to be appropriately communicated (Braga & Kennedy, 2020).

Evidence base

Descriptive overview

Braga et al. (2019) reviewed 24 evaluations of focussed deterrence strategies that used quasi-experimental designs. Half of the programmes targeted criminally active gangs (*n* = 12), nine targeted open-air drug markets, and three programmes targeted high-risk offenders. Only one of the evaluations was conducted outside of the United States. This evaluation was conducted in Scotland (Williams et al., 2014). Studies were published between 2001 and 2015.

Assessment of the evidence rating

We have confidence that, at the time of writing, the review by Braga et al. (2019) is the best available evidence on the effectiveness of focussed deterrence. Our decision rule for determining the evidence rating is summarised in the technical guide.

A modified version of the AMSTAR2 critical appraisal tool was used to appraise the review by Braga et al. (2019) by two independent coders. According to this tool, the Braga et al. (2019) review was rated as 'medium'. The results are summarised in Annex 3.

Braga et al. (2019) adequately specified the research questions and the inclusion/exclusion criteria, relating to the population, intervention, comparison group and outcome of interest Specifically, Braga et al. (2019) included evaluations of interventions that included the core components of focussed deterrence strategies, included a comparison group (or a one-group-only interrupted time-series design), and reported at least one crime outcome.

Braga et al. (2019) specify that they created a coding protocol before undertaking the review but do not state whether or not the protocol was published. The review is based on an existing published review of focussed deterrence.

Braga et al. (2019) included evaluations that were conducted using quasi-experimental designs and noted the lack of scientifically rigorous evaluations.

The review reported a comprehensive literature search strategy of different databases, using designated keywords. No restrictions were placed on inclusion criteria to only peer-reviewed

publications or only reports in English. Evaluations that met inclusion criteria for the review were coded independently by two of the authors, and issues were resolved by discussion between the three authors.

Braga et al. (2019) evaluated risk of bias using the Cochrane Collaboration risk of bias tool.

The original review was funded by the National Policing Improvement Agency in the UK, but no funding for the updated review by Braga et al. (2019) was received. The reviewers report that one of the authors, Anthony Braga, has evaluated a number of focussed deterrence strategies.

The reviewers conducted a meta-analysis and reported detailed information on the synthesis and estimation of weighted effect sizes and adequately reported the heterogeneity between primary effects. Separate weighted effect sizes for independent outcomes were reported and multiple moderators were assessed as possible explanations for heterogeneity among primary effect sizes.

Braga et al. (2019) reported a direct estimate of focussed deterrence strategies on offending outcomes based on 24 evaluations. There was high heterogeneity between primary effect sizes (I^2 = 81%) and the review was rated 'medium' as per the AMSTAR tool, so that the evidence rating is 4.

Impact

Summary impact measure

Braga et al. (2019) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the effectiveness of focussed deterrence strategies to reduce offending. The mean effect size for offending includes outcomes such as violent crime, gun assaults, youth homicides, weapon carrying, property crime, and gang shootings. Mean effect sizes are not reported for individual types of offending. Although the results are not presented independently for juvenile and adult offenders, the large effect size suggests that focussed deterrence strategies are effective. The results of the meta-analysis are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Mean effect size for officially recorded crimes.

Study	ES	CI	*p*	% reduction	Evidence rating
Braga et al. (2019)	*d* = 0.383 OR = 2.00	0.26 – 0.50	< .05	33%	4

Note: ES = the weighted mean effect size; CI = 95% confidence intervals for the mean ES; *p* = the statistical significance of the mean ES; OR = odds ratio; *d* = Cohen's *d.*

In order to convert the *d* effect size to a percentage reduction, we first used the equation: Ln(OR) = *d* / 0.5513 (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 202). Then we assumed that there were equal numbers (*n* = 100) in the experimental and control conditions, and that 50% of persons in the control condition offended. With these assumptions, the OR of 2.00 for Braga et al. (2019) translated to 33.3% of experimental persons offending, which is a large 33.3% relative reduction compared to the offending rate in the comparison group. These transformations are explained further in Annex 1.

We focus on reoffending because focussed deterrence is targeted on offending groups and gangs. For consistency with other technical reports focussing on reoffending, we assume a 50% overall reoffending rate. This is quite plausible; for example, in England and Wales, 37% of juvenile offenders in the period October to December 2018 had proven (recorded) reoffending only one year later (Ministry of Justice, 2020). It would be expected that their reoffending rate would soon reach 50% within another two years or so given findings from previous research and the likely high recidivism rate in young people (Farrington, 2012; Farrington, 2017).

Moderators and mediators

Braga et al. (2019) included a number of different moderator analyses, but the results are not reported independently for juvenile offenders. Overall, there were differences in the mean effect sizes for the programme type showing that interventions that targeted gang

membership were associated with the largest effect size (d = 0.657, p < .05). Focussed deterrence strategies that targeted 'high-risk' individuals were also effective (d = 0.204, p < .05) but interventions that were categorised as 'drug market interventions' were associated with smaller mean effect size (d = 0.091, p < .05). Braga et al. (2019) note that the smaller mean effect size associated with drug market interventions could be a consequence of the significant threats to treatment integrity or implementation issues. Research design was also a significant moderator variable in the meta-analysis, and Braga et al. (2019) found that non-equivalent quasi-experimental designs were associated with larger effect sizes (d = 0.703, p < .05), in comparison to matched quasi-experimental designs (d = 0.194, p < .05).

Implementation and Cost analysis

Braga et al. (2019) do not include any information on implementation issues or cost-effectiveness from evaluations of focussed deterrence strategies.

We summarize evidence from three evaluations, one of which presents evidence from seven sites in the United States, one which presents evidence from one site in the United States and in London, and one of Operation Shield in three London boroughs (Davies et al., 2016).

The support of staff – both management and the police officers implementing the intervention – are an important support factor when they are present but are often a barrier, especially if the police department is under-resourced. Since focussed deterrence allows known offenders a second chance despite their being evidence against them, police may see it as being soft on crime, and possibly contrary to existing approaches or their own beliefs about police work.

Clarity on the programme model and training are important to ensure proper implementation of the focussed deterrence model. Inadequate preparation, including training, can lead to low implementation fidelity.

Community buy-in is an important part of the model and should be ensured before proceeding. However, where there is strong distrust of the police prior to the intervention,

this buy-in can be difficult to achieve. The situation can be exacerbated by insufficient communication by the police prior to serving arrest notices. The call-in meeting should be on neutral territory, as it is less likely to serve its intended purpose if it is not.

Service coordination is important. Some service providers may be reluctant to work and share information with the police. Inter-force coordination may be needed where gangs straddle administrative boundaries.

Police can struggle to find the balance between deterrence and protection. This tension may arise during the call-in meeting in which inappropriate messaging can alienate the community representatives.

Davies et al. (2016) outline a series of challenges faced in an implementation of a group violence intervention, that was conducted as a focussed deterrence approach, in London. The key challenges included concerns over the suitability of a US approach in the United Kingdom, where there are a number of differences in the criminal justice system, a lower rate of serious violence and more fluid gang structures. Police in London boroughs were also limited by the lack of available civil sanctions that could be used in lieu of legal sanctions and found it difficult to ensure 'swift and certain' sanctions against gang members given ongoing police activity and the fact that police in England and Wales do not retain actionable information on offending. There were also misunderstandings in the interpretation of the group-violence intervention model, and Davies et al. (2016, p. 3) recommend that the programme would have benefitted from earlier input from the National Network for Safer Communities. Finally, community engagement and support were difficult to achieve and there were general poor community relations across the multiple agencies involved (Davies et al., 2016).

Some benefits of the programme were the noted progress in community engagement, with a range of individuals and voluntary groups coming together to reduce violence and support gang-involved youth (Davies et al., 2016). The positive links between the community, police and local authorities was an important benefit of the Operation Shield pilot programme. The

enhanced consultative process and increased transparency were also perceived as desirable outcomes of the approach.

Focussed deterrence elements have now been integrated into business-as-usual activity across all three London boroughs that participated in Operation Shield. In the future, projects should ensure a wider partnership buy-in (between police, probation and third sector organisations) and adopt a more sensitive approach to branding and messaging about the project across communities (Davies et al., 2016).

No cost analysis is available. But several studies note that it is a resource-intensive approach.

What do we need to know? What don't we know?

It is possible that in using focussed deterrence strategies, racial targeting will occur. It is important that in implementing focussed deterrence, police do not use these interventions as justification for unwarranted stop and searches of BAME individuals and are effective in communicating the reasons for targeting particular groups. It must be made clear that the targets for focussed deterrence are selected because of their offending and not because of their race. Furthermore, the additional support and outreach that occurs through focussed deterrence needs to be aware of institutional racism and systematic barriers in society, and needs to be sensitive to racial and cultural issues.

Evaluations of focussed deterrence are needed in England and Wales, which address the local context. Additional efforts should be made to find evaluations of previous attempts to use the approach, such as Operation Shield. Both contextual safeguarding and liaison and diversion services are widespread, which provide the protective element of a focussed deterrence approach. These approaches need to be joined up with the deterrence element targeted on high-risk individuals and evaluated for effects for youth crime, both on those targeted and on those who would get involved in gangs in the absence of an intervention, e.g. through county lines.

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Annex 1: Effect size calculations

This annex shows the calculation based on the results and assumptions given in the text. We assume 200 youth, evenly divided between treatment and comparison groups. That means there are 100 youth in the control group and 100 youth in the treatment group. Assuming that 50% of youth in the control group reoffended, the mean effect sizes Braga et al. (2019) can be easily transformed to a percentage reduction in offending.

If the odds ratio for the incidence of offending is 2.00, then using the table below and the formula for an OR, we can estimate the value of X. The odds ratio is estimated as: A*D/B*C, where A is the number of individuals in the treatment group who do not reoffend, B is the number of individuals in the treatment group who reoffend, C is the number of individuals in the control group who do not reoffend, and D is the number of individuals in the control group who reoffend. Therefore, the value of X is 33.33 in the case of Braga et al. (2019).

	Do not reoffend	Reoffend	Total
Treatment	100-x	x	100
Control	50	50	100

Therefore, the relative reduction in offending is (50 – 33.33)/50 = 33.3%.

The prevalence of reoffending is likely to vary between studies and can be influenced greatly by the type of report (e.g., self-report or official police records), the type of offending (e.g., violent offending or theft offences), and the length of the time period covered. If we were to adjust our assumption that 50% of the control group reoffend, the overall relative reduction in the intervention group is not greatly affected.

For example, if we assume that 40% of the control group reoffend, the 2x2 table would be as follows and the value of X is 25. Therefore, the relative reduction is 37.5% (i.e., (40 - 25)/40]*100).

	Do not reoffend	Reoffend	Total
Treatment	100-x	x	100
Control	60	40	100

Similarly, if we assume that 60% of the control group reoffend, the relative reduction in offending is 28.6%. Given the significant difference in the assumed prevalence of offending, the percentage relative reduction does not vary so much. Table 2 shows this further.

Table 2

Variation of the relative reduction in offending depending on various estimates.

	Braga et al. (2019) OR = 2.00
Assumed prevalence	Relative reduction
40%	37.5%
50%	33.3%
60%	28.6%

Annex 2: Process evaluation summaries

Author & Title	Intervention	Findings
Hipple & Corsaro The High Point Drug Market Initiative: A Process and Impact Assessment Project Safe Neighborhoods Case Study #12	The High Point Drug Market Initiative (DMI) by The High Point Police Department in High Point, North Carolina is based on a geographically focused deterrence strategy and police-community partnerships offering sources of social support to prevent the re-emergence of the drug market. Four interlaced goals of DMI were: 1) eliminate open-air drug markets;	**Implementation** Different conceptualization of problem: The problem was conceptualized as a 'drug market problem' rather than 'drug problem'. Implementation in a detailed and rigorous manner consistent with traditions of the approach involving consultations with pioneers of the strategy such as David Kennedy and others. The implementation of DMI involved 9 steps: Step 1: Identification and mapping of target area from multiple sources such as 911 calls and calls for service, field contacts made by officers, drug arrests etc. Step 2: Identification of drug dealers in the target area by meeting police officers, probation officers, vice officers working in the target area, and community members living in the area. Step 3: Modified Incident review by the vice/narcotics detectives involving reviewing information person by person rather than

	2) return the neighbourhood to the residents; 3) reduce crime and disorder; and 4) improve the public's safety as well as their quality of life	case by case. Step 4: The vice/narcotics officers focused on trying to build cases on the identified drug dealers. Step 5: Mobilizing and engaging the community by Police and redressing misconceptions at both ends. Step 6: Reaching out to 'Influencers' (identified family member or other influential people) and encouraging them to attend call-in. A small group of police officers, community members, and clergy reached out to the influencers. Step 7: A face to face meeting between the offenders, the community, and law enforcement and giving a rare second chance to offender despite all the evidence with law enforcement agencies. Step 8: Enforcing the standards that had been set at the call-in: no more drug dealing in West End. Step 9: Sustaining the gains made through intervention with drug market by working with local neighbourhood leaders, the faith community, schools, businesses, and residents to improve the quality of life and build the type of social relationships.

Densley and Squier Jones Pulling Levers on Gang Violence in London and St Paul	Gang violence intervention with structure pulling levers approach: problem analysis, identify most violent group, engage community 'moral voices' and social service providers, hold a call-in meeting. At call-in meeting: (1) indicate offences no longer tolerated, (2) community leaders speak out against violence, and (3) social service providers indicate what support is available.	Findings by stage of intervention Problem analysis St Paul: Identified most violent group, though officers believed 'touchy feely' approach was not appropriate and against the force's ethos London: competition to be first to adopt GVI resulted in competition between agencies resulting in a piecemeal approach. Gangs straddle borough boundaries. Demonstration enforcement action St Paul: warrants served at home, saying could avoid arrest if come to call-in (parents also invited, signed form); told translators and Mexican Embassy would be at meeting. Allowed officers to assess home environment.

		London: Coordinated police raids resulted in 515 gang related arrests. But this business as usual for police not linked to GVI partly as services adhering to protective factors model without engaging police. Community moral voices and social services St Paul: Having representative from Mexican Consulate helped assuage community concerns. Had to communicate that about crime reduction not immigration. Another key partner was Neighborhood House's Gang Reduction and Intervention Program (GRIP) which already had trust from gang members because of the services it provided. London: The approach was seen as an attack on ethnic minorities so community voices opted out of the conversation. The call-in

		St Paul: held in community venue, well attended by 70 people including 17 of 22 invited gang members. Speakers included a local Latino officer who had grown up in the community and the County Prosecutor who said they had evidence to prosecute but would prefer not to if they changed their behaviour. London: High profile call-in at Wood Green Crown Court which was seen as insensitive as not an unthreatening venue. Only 10 of 30 invited offenders showed up (there were more journalists than offenders). That was higher than previous call-in in which rival gangs were invited, a fight broke out and a service provider was stabbed. The language used by police was all stick with no carrot – no service information was provided. Maintenance and ensuring program integrity St Paul: 30-60-90 visits in which parents filled out progress reports. Suggest impact began to wane, but reduction in violence spilled over to rival gang. Police frustrated that other service providers would not share information. But programme not repeated despite other

		gang violence problems in the city, possibly because resource intensive, and also because of staff turnover. London: London piloting Operation Shield in three Boroughs using a GVI approach.
Tom Davies, Lynne Grossmith & Paul Dawson	Group Violence Intervention London: An Evaluation of the Shield Pilot. Pilot of the Group Violence Intervention in three London boroughs: Lambeth, Haringey, and Westminster	Barriers Applicability of US model questioned as gangs different in nature. Also the approach contradicted the approach of 'not storing risk', especially since lack of civil sanctions. Differences in understanding of the model lead to differences in design – model perceived to lack clarity for practical application. Poor community relations led to resistance to pilot. Success factor

		Over time community and service provider engagement increased communication and transparency.
Braga, Davis & White, 2012 Boston, Massachusetts Smart Policing Initiative Evaluating a Place-Based Intervention to Reduce Violent Crime	Safe Street Team (SST) is a place-based strategy and involved assigning police officer teams to 13 different violent crime hot spots in Boston. The SSTs applied problem-oriented, community-policing strategies to identify and address recurring problems in their target areas. The problem-oriented policing techniques broadly fell under three categories: environmental /situational; enforcement and	**Implementation** Using computerized mapping technology and violent index crime data from 2006, BPD identified and targeted 13 violent crime hot spots for intervention. Each SST consisted of a sergeant and six patrol officers. The SSTs were responsible for employing community and problem-oriented policing techniques (e.g., SARA model—scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) to identify and address recurring problems in the targeted areas. Some of the components of the program included: (1) In-service training that focused both on the SST program specifically and problem-oriented policing more generally. (2) Engaging community and local members to identify and responding problems. SST officers

	community outreach/social service interventions. *Environment interventions* included removing graffiti and trash; adding or fixing lighting; removing abandoned vehicles; posting signage (e.g., no trespassing); installing CCTV systems; evicting problem tenants; repairing sidewalks, fences, and locks; and giving out crime prevention literature. *Enforcement interventions* included focused enforcement	were required to stay in their assigned areas unless an emergency call required their involvement. (3) Review of crime trends and discussion with officers. Interventions were specific to nature of problems. The number and type of interventions varied notably across the SST hot spots depending on the nature of the problems in each location Success factors: (1) Compatibility with evidence-based policing model: The Boston SPI experience highlights how the realities of police program development and implementation are indeed compatible with an evidence-based policing model. (2) Police-University Partnerships: In-service training with a model curriculum - The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing offers a model curriculum that police managers can use to ensure that officers have a complete understanding of all phases of the strategy and to reduce the likelihood that officers will stray from the model when working in the field

	efforts on drug selling crews, street gangs, robbery crews, burglars/shoplifters, public housing trespassers and unregulated vendors, as well as focused efforts on indicators of social disorder (public drinking, loitering, etc.). *Community outreach/social service interventions:* activities sought to engage SST area residents and business owners in crime prevention, as well as to provide services and related opportunities to those engaged in	Barriers in general, and not specific to SPI mentioned in the report included: • Resistance to change by the officers concerned. • Insufficient engagement of the police officers. • Insufficient records, particularly pertaining to situational and community outreach interventions. • Some SST officers implemented the problem-oriented policing intervention as intended, while others relied on more traditional, enforcement-based responses

	disorderly and criminal behaviour. These activities included providing new recreational opportunities for youth (e.g., basketball leagues), partnering with local agencies to provide needed social services to youth, working with clinicians to provide street outreach to the homeless, and planning community events (e.g., block parties).	
Picard-Fritsche, Swaner, and Lambson, 2014	One of the main programmatic components of the Brownsville Anti-Violence Project is hosting of monthly call-in meetings with	**Success factors** Non-threatening atmosphere for the call-in with respectful moderators: The venue of the "call-ins" is a Library, a neutral location that is welcoming to anyone in the community. The

Deterrence and Legitimacy in Brownsville, Brooklyn A Process Evaluation of the Brownsville Anti-Violence Project	high-risk parolees. The "call-ins" are modelled after the Project Safe Neighbourhoods Initiative, which aims to enhance deterrence and increase legitimacy by presenting a united front among law enforcement and key community players.	combination of the location, the physical layout of the room, the circular configuration of the tables, and the less-formal presentation styles all create a nonthreatening atmosphere for the call-in. Consistency in messages and respectful tone of the representatives from the Kings County District Attorney's and U.S. Attorney's offices. Respectful tone and Approachable AFT: A panelist from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATP) was mostly present at call-ins. The respectful tone, a person of colour and casually dressing up was helpful in making connections with the participants. Engagement of Youth and Community in the Community Mobilization Campaign: Youth and other residents were also encouraged to help design the campaign's logo and slogan – "Brownsville: Stronger Together" **Barriers** Inconsistent message of NYPD representative and altogether absence occasionally.

		Inconsistent messages and not a respectful tone by some of the formerly incarcerated individuals. The social service agencies have not been specific about the services they are offering. Additionally, there has been some concern about whether the services that are offered are the services that the attendees actually need. Panelists going off-topic.
Saunders, Ober, Kilmer, and Greathouse, 2016	Community-based focussed deterrence for closing drug markets across seven sites in the United States	**Flint, Michigan:** Despite the budgetary and manpower constraints, FPD were creatively handling the challenges. • Strong commitment of the team members towards community and community safety was one of the factors responsible for sustaining Flint initiative despite serious financial constraints.

A Community based focused deterrence approach to closing overt drug markets: A process and fidelity evaluation of seven sites		• One individual said team members also use connections they have or leveraged resources through their workplaces to help make up for the lack of resources. They are always looking for grants or other funding opportunities. Barriers: • Budgetary constraint was a major challenge. • A great deal of pressure was there to move forward with the program without full preparation or complete knowledge of the steps, resulting in skipped or incomplete steps throughout the process. • Delays of more than a year in holding the call-in following the first media announcement about the DMI in Flint led to distrust from both the media and area residents. • Pushing forward with the program without a full understanding of the program • The implementation of the intervention did not strictly follow the model on which they were trained. Also, the aspects of Flint's program still did not align with the standard protocol. **Guntersville, Alabama** • One of the greatest advantages for the Guntersville team was the high level of support received from local leadership, including the Marshall County District Attorney's Office. As a result, the team was effectively able to target candidates and prosecute A-listers and the one noncompliant B-lister. • The team also received a great deal of support from community leaders, including religious leaders, local business owners, and social services. As a result, a number of community events were held both before and after the call-in.

		Barriers • Lack of community buy-in, as there is a great deal of distrust of the police. There were two open lawsuits against the police department from residents in the Lake-view Community for excessive force and racial discrimination prior to the interven-tion, and another one was filed less than a year after the call-in. • Difficulty involving community: Participants at community events consisted mostly of team members and community leaders, with comparably few target-area residents in attendance. **Jacksonville, Florida** **Barriers** • Lack of commitment by a law enforcement agency that was undergoing budget cuts and short on staff. • Reorganization within the sheriff's office • Lack of commitment from the State's Attorney

		Lake County, Indiana • Commitment of the team members **Barriers** • Lack of resources and technology and not a police priority: The programme, conceived and led by the prosecutor's office, ultimately was not a priority for a police department short on resources and technology. The effort was brought to a halt by prolonged political uncertainty followed by lack of active engagement on the part of the new mayor and police chief. The Lake County experience makes clear that the intervention must be a police priority to succeed. **Montgomery County, Maryland** • The Montgomery County intervention was unique because it targeted a small geographic area—only about one square block—and all of the targeted A-listers and B-listers lived within the same apartment complex. • The team held several follow-up meetings with the community in the six months after the call-in, the police worked with the property manager to address disorder, and the HHS representatives visited the community regularly to offer a variety of services to adults and adolescents.

		Barriers • Due to its focus solely on a Section 8 housing complex, it deviated from the original training script in that there were few efforts to engage the community in the process before the call-in. • Also, due to the small size of the target area, the large number of A-listers arrested, and the lack of community engagement before the call-in, it was not until after the call-in that community members became aware of the purpose of the intervention and that it was more than a coordinated police raid. **New Orleans, Louisiana** **Barriers** • Lack of support and involvement from higher-ranking NOPD officials. • Significant reorganizations within NOPD created even more uncertainty about support for the intervention • Diversion of resources and funds to festivals and events in New Orleans throughout the year. • Not following training model. • Failure to involve the larger community or inform them of the program. Because of the loss of all but one B-lister to A-lister status, the team could not conduct a call-in.

		Roanoke, Virginia • Dedicated police chief and a police lieutenant to the initiative's ideals and strategy laid the groundwork in Roanoke. The police lieutenant coordinating the intervention demonstrated to the community that the police truly did care about the neighbourhood. • Community involvement: The core team recognized the history of poor relationships between the public and police in Hurt Park and Melrose-Rugby and the importance of community involvement to the success of the intervention. Keeping this in mind, the core team strived to have continual involvement within the target area to show residents the city's dedication to improving the neighbourhood. • A new tailored program for the B-listers: TAP and Virginia Cares created a new tailored program for the B-listers and provided the B-listers with key social services and life training. **Barrier** • Lack of buy-in from the community: In spite of police efforts to engage the community, residents remained sceptical of the intervention and to a certain extent were simply waiting for fallout from the program or for the neighbourhood to revert back

Annex 3: AMSTAR Rating

Modified AMSTAR item		Scoring guide	Focussed deterrence
			Braga 2019
1	Did the research questions and inclusion criteria for the review include the components of the PICOS?	To score 'Yes' appraisers should be confident that the 5 elements of PICO are described somewhere in the report	Yes
2	Did the review authors use a comprehensive literature search strategy?	At least two bibliographic databases should be searched (partial yes) plus at least one of website searches or snowballing (yes).	Yes
3	Did the review authors perform study selection in duplicate?	Score yes if double screening or single screening with independent check on at least 5-10%	Yes
4	Did the review authors perform data extraction in duplicate?	Score yes if double coding	Yes
5	Did the review authors describe the included studies in adequate detail?	Score yes if a tabular or narrative summary of included studies is provided.	Yes
6	Did the review authors use a satisfactory technique for assessing the risk of bias (RoB) in individual studies that were included in the review?	Score yes if there is any discussion of any source of bias such as attrition, and including publication bias.	Yes

7	Did the review authors provide a satisfactory explanation for, and discussion of, any heterogeneity observed in the results of the review?	Yes if the authors report heterogeneity statistic. Partial yes if there is some discussion of heterogeneity.	Yes
8	Did the review authors report any potential sources of conflict of interest, including any funding they received for conducting the review? Overall	Yes if authors report funding and mention any conflict of interest	Yes High



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